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Abstract
In Kenya, the Vision 2030 masterplan is radically reimagining Nairobi as a ‘world class’ city of the future. This has gener-
ated dramatic digital imagery of satellite cities, skyscrapers and shopping malls. For tenants in rundown public housing,
these glossy yet speculative visions are enticing, but also provoke anxieties of exclusion. Yet so far, little has materially
manifested. This article explores the effects these future vistas produce in the present, in the gap between the urban plan
and its implementation. It argues that the spectacle of official planning has generated anticipatory actions, as Nairobians’
engage with the future promised by such schemes. These actions are characterised by dissonant temporal experiences, in
which local residents experience the future city as both near at hand and forever out of reach.
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1. Introduction
New urban fantasies have been flourishing across Africa
in recent years. Rwanda, Ghana, Angola, Tanzania, Nige-
ria, Democratic Republic of Congo and Kenya have all
seen their governments launch urban megaprojects that
promise to radically reshape African cities. Typified by
spectacular infrastructural projects and new satellite
cities, these schemes are also envisioned as gateways for
global capital, forming a new node in a network of hub
cities that include Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, Dubai and
Hyderabad. This article focuses on such visions of the fu-
ture in Nairobi, Kenya, and in particular the disconnect
between the government’s ‘Vision 2030’ initiative and
the lives of ordinary citizens. Fantasies of the city’s fu-
ture form are already visible in Nairobi, through adver-
tisements, billboards and computer-generated imagery
that circulate in the present. But the actual realisation of
such plans has been slow tomaterialise. Yet even though
little may havematerially manifested on the ground, nev-
ertheless the spectacle of official planning has set in mo-
tion many kinds of anticipatory actions, as Nairobians
engage with the future promised by such schemes. In
the temporal and spatial gap between the plan and its
manifestation, I argue, Nairobi residents experience the
future as simultaneously close at hand and impossibly
far off.
2. Vision 2030 and the ‘World Class’ City
‘Vision 2030’ is the Kenyan government’s development
blueprint for the country’s future (see Linehan, 2007;
Manji, 2015;Myers, 2014). Launched in 2007 by the then
President Mwai Kibaki, Kenya Vision 2030 mobilises the
now-familiar vocabularies of neoliberal development,
emphasising competition, management, performance
and accountability as it seeks to create an ‘issue-based,
people-centred, results-oriented and accountable demo-
cratic system’ (Kenya Vision2030, n.d.). Nested within
this larger vision is ‘Nairobi Metro 2030’, a strategy to
reinvent Nairobi as a ‘world class Africanmetropolis’ and
‘an iconic and globally attractive city’ oriented towards
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ICT services, global corporations and business invest-
ment (Government of Kenya, 2008). In 2008, the Kenyan
government launched a new ministry, the Ministry of
Nairobi Metropolitan Development, tasked with imple-
menting this vision for the city. The flagship projects of
Nairobi Metro 2030 are not located in the existing city,
but are two satellite cities planned for Nairobi’s periph-
ery: Tatu City and Konza Techno City—dubbed ‘Silicon Sa-
vannah’ by the Kenyan and international media. To be
financed by conglomerates of private capital and devel-
oped and managed through private partnerships, such
urban plans exemplify ‘the spread of neo-liberal ideology
that brings state and national governments into close col-
laboration with corporations’ (Moser, 2015, p. 31).
Vision 2030 presents a hyper-capitalist, technologi-
cally futuristic vision of Nairobi as a model ‘global city’
(Sassen, 1991). Far from developing an urban strategy
that would enhance the distinctive qualities of Nairobi,
Vision 2030 conforms to the spatial logics and aesthet-
ics of a certain brand of global city masterplanning. In a
process Bunnell and Das have described as ‘urban repli-
cation’, a small but seductive set of visions, policies and
templates have duplicated the same spectacular skylines,
neoliberal structuring and corporate management sys-
tems in multiple city plans across Asia and Africa (Bun-
nell & Das, 2010, p. 278). This process has had the ef-
fect of producing an aspirational uniformity; a placeless
urban morphology that is at once nowhere and every-
where (Moser, 2015, p. 32). Such imitative practices are
in part a consequence of the promise of spectacular tech-
nological and infrastructural transformation. In the eyes
of many regional leaders, the perceived success of early
adopters of the ‘world class’ approach made them wor-
thy models for emulation. The global reach of cities such
as Kuala Lumpur, Dubai and Singapore has validated a set
of urban planning approaches rooted in economic liber-
alisation, corporate-led urban development andmanage-
ment, and gleaming, high-rise architecture.
But urban replication is not just emulative from a dis-
tance; it is also rooted in specific corporate practice. No-
tably, a small network of experts and consultants have
been involved in the masterplanning of many of these
‘world class’ cities. Kenya’s Vision 2030 strategy was de-
veloped in conjunction with the international consul-
tancy firm McKinsey and Company, who over the last
few decades have been at the heart of this trend (Line-
han, 2007). Before arriving in Kenya, McKinsey previ-
ously worked in India on ‘Vision Mumbai’, also framed
as a ‘world-class city’ (McKinsey, 2003) and on ‘Andhra
Pradesh 2020’, which centred on the revisioning of Hy-
derabad through the construction of ‘Cyberabad’, a high-
tech, IT-dominated satellite city. Earlier, in the 1990s,
McKinsey had already set the standard for the new
‘world class’ city with the ‘Malaysia 2020’ strategy. Based
not only on spectacular infrastructure but strategic imag-
ing and brand management, this heralded the rise of the
‘Asian tiger’ economies and reinvention of Kuala Lumpur
as a node for global investment. A new IT city called
Cyberjaya was conceived, along with a ‘Multimedia Su-
per Corridor’ and the Petronas Twin Towers: the iconic
skyscraper of the new Asian order (Bunnell & Das, 2010,
p. 278).
In this way, the re-imagining of Nairobi as a gleam-
ing hub for global capital is another iteration of a limited
range of transnationally circulating urban policies and
architectural aesthetics which are restructuring cities in
ways that suit the interests of multinational corporations
and affluent, global elites (Murray, 2015, p. 92). The of-
ficial websites of Konza City and Tatu City present dra-
matic, glossy visions of skyscrapers, lakes, parkland and
shopping malls, with promises of ‘exclusive urban living’
that will ‘redefine the quality and scale of urban devel-
opment in Kenya’ with the ‘potential to become a bench-
mark for Africa’ (Konza City, n. d.; Tatu City, n.d.). Such
imaginings bear little relation to the congested, polluted,
densely populated city of Nairobi of today; instead they
present an idealised ‘capsular’ city, sealed off from a
much messier urban reality (De Cauter, 2004). Often ad-
vertised as a ‘city within a city’ or ‘self-contained’, this
enclaved existence is regarded as one of the attractions
of such a plan (Watson, 2013, p. 229). For those with
the economic and social capital to gain access, Konza and
Tatu promise insulation from the supposed disorder and
chaos of existing Nairobi life. Following a mode Roy has
described as ‘worlding’, this is a typology for a future
city that abandons the perceived failures and decay of
the extant city, seeking to begin afresh on vacant land,
creating new enclaves for a hyper-connected global elite
(Roy, 2011). Such ‘city doubles’ are often privately op-
erated: spaces where companies act as proxies for civic
administration, managing urban security, infrastructure,
waste management and other facilities for urban elites,
whilst ordinary, lower income citizens make do with an
increasingly decrepit urban landscape elsewhere (Mur-
ray, 2015, p. 99). In this regard, these urban megapro-
jects reproduce the spatial logics of colonial cities, per-
petuating segregated urbanscapes underwritten by the
languages of neoliberal capital that privilege ‘world class’
status over the spatial and economic justice of local in-
habitants (Moser, 2015; Myers, 2014; Watson, 2013).
3. Visions and Realities
Yet despite its sweeping vision, pervasive imagery and
presence in Kenyan public debate, very little of Vision
2030 has tangibly materialised in the ten years since it
was launched. Many Kenyans now jokingly refer to it ‘Vi-
sion 3020’ to reflect the rate at which implementation
has been proceeding. Konza City is little more than an
enormous fenced-off site in the Ukambani plains; the
same grass growing on the inside and the outside of the
fence. Both Tatu and Konza have been plaguedwith polit-
ical infighting, accusations of land grabbing and commu-
nity tensions (Kamau, 2016; Nzuma, 2014). As Manji has
noted, there are overlapping and sometimes contradic-
tory external and internal factors that shape how infras-
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tructural development proceeds in Kenya (Manji, 2015).
Some commentators question whether the political will
at the highest levels is even there: these were projects
launched by the last president, and current President
Uhuru Kenyatta seems to have little taste for them.
In addition to Konza and Tatu, Nairobi Metro 2030
also works as an umbrella for other fragmentary and
less high-profile infrastructural plans in the city. These
include a new mass transport strategy, the Nairobi Inte-
grated Urban Plan (NIUPLAN) and the Nairobi Metropoli-
tan Improvement Programme (NaMSIP). Far from being
streamlined, these projects are often in competitionwith
each other. Often launched under the aegis of different
political factions, there is considerable confusion over in-
stitutional responsibility. Analysing the mass transport
strategy, Klopp has outlined several factors behind its in-
adequate implementation that also speak to complica-
tions in realising Vision 2030 more broadly:
No single agency or institution deals with all trans-
port matters for the metropolitan region…The cur-
rent fragmentation and lack of a public focal point
works to allow the existing decision-making network
a great deal of leeway to operate. It also allows deci-
sions to be made in ways that favour interested par-
ties within networks of politicians and bureaucrats
linked to key ministries, while defusing responsibili-
ties. (Klopp, 2011, p. 11)
Indeed, the Kenyan Anti-Corruption Commission has re-
ported ‘rampant corruption in the road construction con-
tracts and collusion between contractors and govern-
ment’ (cited in Klopp, 2011, p. 11). In such a fragmented
andmurky climate—and in the wake of a global financial
downturn that has undermined the investment of corpo-
rate capital—it’s perhaps unsurprising there is little of Vi-
sion 2030 to be seen on the ground.
Nevertheless, despite its lack of implementation, de-
lays and issues of corruption, Vision 2030 has still had
a significant impact. The utopian vocabularies and visu-
alisations of Nairobi as a world class city that are cur-
rently in circulation are powerfully affective in their own
right. Several scholars have observed how these ‘tech-
nologies of seduction’ have been as crucial to developing
the global brand of cities such as Kuala Lumpur, Shanghai
and Hyderabad as any physically tangible infrastructure
projects (Bunnell &Das, 2010, p. 281; Brosius, 2010; Jans-
son & Lagerkvist, 2009). In Nairobi, glossy digital simula-
tions of brand new cities, billboards showing desirable
homes, elaborate websites promising a ‘competitive and
prosperous nation’ and ‘middle income status by 2030’
are aspirational and enchanting (Konza Techno City, no
date). They influence not only policies but also every-
day lives in the city, exerting a seductive hold over or-
dinary Nairobians and producing important material and
imaginative effects. In the following sections I argue that
rather than seeing the absence of infrastructural trans-
formation on the ground as indicative of Vision 2030’s
failure, its visual and linguistic culture is materially and
temporally significant in its own right. Attending to the
digital, virtual and visual realm of Vision 2030 can also
help to recalibrate scholarship on the efficacy of urban
masterplanning, away from notions of success or failure
based on the realisation or not of a specific plan, towards
a more speculative, open-ended approach which recog-
nises how digital simulations, consultancy reports, bill-
boards and images of the future city act in the world.
They are part of the ‘stuff’ out of which urban lives are
remade and futures are reoriented—technologies of se-
ductive power that become enmeshed in the fabric of
urban life (Bunnell & Das, 2010, p. 282).
4. Image, Word, Form
Nairobi is far from the only place to experience a breach
between urban dreams and their materialisation as phys-
ical realities. Discussing the reconstruction of central
Berlin after the end of the wall, Andreas Huyssen noted
the dazzling power exerted by visualisations of architec-
ture in a mediatised cultural economy. He observed that
the monumental effect of architecture can be just as
easily—possibly better—achieved through a ‘totalising
image of architecture. No need even to build the real
thing’ (Huyssen, 2003, p. 47). Instead of demonstrating
a future that is to be made actual, ‘the very image of the
city itself becomes central to its success in a globally com-
petitive market’ (Huyssen, 2003, p. 60). A similar process
can be seen in the restructuring of Shanghai, where spec-
tacular digital imagery, promotional videos, and graphics-
heavy websites have turned the city into a ‘visual sign’,
the production of which is increasingly a political project
(Jansson & Lagerkvist, 2009, p. 26). Branded, packaged
urban panoramas are not simply or even necessarily pre-
monitions of actual built space to come, but achieve
monumental seduction in themselves.
In Kinshasa, capital of the Democratic Republic of
Congo, the urban techno-fantasy Cité du Fleuve imag-
ines a vast new satellite city, to be built on artificial is-
lands in the middle of the Congo River. An improbably
huge leap from Kinshasa’s current chaotic reality, Cité du
Fleuve is more ‘spectral’ and ‘chimerical’ than convinc-
ing urban morphology (De Boeck, 2012). So vast is the
gap between disintegrating urban present and futuristic
megalopolis that the otherworldly skyline ‘escapes from
the real order of things’, and ‘it almost doesn’t seem to
matter whether the new city is physically built or not’
(De Boeck, 2012, p. 323). Whereas for Huyssen or Jans-
son and Lagerkvist, it is the seductive power of imagery
that constructs the future city without the need for ac-
tual materials, in Kinshasa, De Boeck argues, it is words:
‘the only place where the city is constantly being built is
in language, in the architecture of words’ (2012, p. 324).
Rather than expecting these fantasies to produce actual
built forms, De Boeck argues that we should focus in-
stead on ‘the sheer force of the word’ and accept that
it is words that offer ‘one of the most important building
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blocks with which to conquer, alter, and erect the city
over and over again’ (2012, p. 324).
In Nairobi, the words and images of Vision 2030 are
indeed erecting the city afresh, without seeming to ad-
vance towards tangible materiality. But this is not the
only form of urban envisioning at work. The fantasies
of Vision 2030 intersect in important ways with ordi-
nary residents’ own modes of imagining and construct-
ing the future. Far from remaining in the distant fu-
ture, the dazzle of these promised scenes, I argue, can
have very powerful imaginative and material effects in
the present. During fourteen months of ethnographic re-
search in Kaloleni, a low-income, public housing project
in the Eastlands area of Nairobi, I investigated how lo-
cal residents are engaging with the radical re-envisioning
of their city (see Smith, 2016). I found that, though they
may live far from the proposed sites of Konza and Tatu,
residents are nevertheless caught up in their swirling im-
age trail. These urban fantasies become entangled with
themundane actualities of ordinary life, in a process Jane
Bennett has described as ‘the marvellous erupting in the
everyday’ (2001, p. 8).
Kaloleni is one of several surviving colonial-era pub-
lic housing estates in Eastlands, a diverse quarter of
Nairobi to the northeast of the city centre. Kaloleni was
built in the 1940s as part of a colonial masterplanning
initiative to reinvent Nairobi as an orderly, segregated
‘city in the sun’ (Thornton White, Silberman, & Ander-
son, 1948). As well as designing dramatic boulevards and
monumental city architecture, this masterplan was in-
tended to improve housing conditions for Africans in the
city (Anderson, 2001). Following garden city principles of
urban planning that were popular across the empire at
the time, Kaloleni was designed as a model urban neigh-
bourhood that would inculcate colonially-sanctioned val-
ues and produce amenable urban subjects. There are
a number of continuities in rhetoric and practice be-
tween Nairobi’s colonial masterplanning and the current
discourses of Vision 2030, not least regarding the per-
ceived dangers of the pre-existing urban fabric and the
need to plan secure, self-contained neighbourhoods on
empty land (see Smith, 2015). Colonial concern about
public health and morality feared informal settlements
as unchecked breeding grounds not only for disease, but
also vice and degeneracy (White, 1990). Such fears find
their echo in current commentary about the rampant
growth of slums, overcrowding and urban crime (Moser,
2015, p. 33). More specifically, in an early case of urban
replication, the architect of Kaloleni was A. J. S. Hutton,
formerly senior colonial architect in the British colony of
Malaya (nowMalaysia). He was seconded to Nairobi Mu-
nicipal Council in 1942 to help reconceive the city’s form,
following his experience of designing new urban neigh-
bourhoods in Malaya—an intriguing historical reverbera-
tion of McKinsey’s role in the ‘world class’ re-visioning of
both Kuala Lumpur and Nairobi (Bunnell & Das, 2010).
Today, decades of mismanagement by city authori-
ties have left Kaloleni dilapidated and decayed. Houses
are rundown, water no longer runs in the pipes and in-
frastructure is at breaking point. Despite being public ten-
ants, residents no longer receive services from the coun-
cil. As in other public housing estates in Eastlands, such
as Jerusalem, Jericho and Shauri Moyo, the original hous-
ing of Kaloleni is now interspersed with informal settle-
ments, while stretches of public land have been grabbed
and illegally developed. After decades of neglect, Vi-
sion 2030 promises long-awaited urban renewal of the
Eastlands public housing. The project, titled the Nairobi
Metropolitan Services Improvement Project (NaMSIP), is
a less ostentatious constituent of Nairobi Metro 2030,
and is intended to combat ‘urban decay’ in the city. How-
ever, exactly what this strategy will mean in practice is
hard to tell: announcements and documentation are rid-
dled with contradictions, and exactly what will be demol-
ished, what will be built, and how residents might be
affected remains unclear (Smith, 2016, ch. 1; Waitatu,
2013). For example, some news coverage has suggested
that new housing will be for sale rather than rental, but
the government has also stated that residents will not be
displaced, despite the fact that very few would have the
capital needed to purchase property (see Wanga, 2014).
NaMSIP is partly facilitated by the World Bank in con-
junction with both the Nairobi city authorities and the
national Ministry of Nairobi Metropolitan Development.
These different units all have different agendas and are
also highly politicised, leading to considerable delays and
hiatuses with the scheme. Their various tiers of inter-
secting and sometimes competing authority do not shed
much clarity on the direction of the strategy (see My-
ers, 2014).
Unsurprisingly, such uncertainty has caused much
consternation in the affected communities. Local resi-
dents remain ambivalent aboutwhat regenerationmight
mean: on the one hand urban renewal might offer a
brighter future if it means increasing employment, rais-
ing living standards and reducing poverty, but many are
anxious that it will happen at their expense. One profes-
sional Nairobi architect predicted that the scheme will
be ‘the biggest gentrification [project] in Africa’, bringing
the displacement of thousands of poorer households in
favour of high net-worth renters and buyers’ (personal
communication). In Kaloleni, the uncertainty surround-
ing Nairobi Metro 2030 and its proposals have sparked
endless discussion and debate. In De Boeck’s terms, res-
idents’ words—in the form of verbal approvals, evalua-
tions or castigations—do indeed ‘erect the city over and
over again’, as Boniface, a Kaloleni resident, made clear:
There’s been stories. There’s a time [I heard] they’d
secured contractors to come down and build these
structures but it was only politics. It fades away, some
other stories come. So nobody knows. Nobody knows
for sure.
But these promised futures do far more than simply gen-
erate words and debate. The gap between the dream of
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the plan and its realisation is full of action: new ways
of being and doing, of grasping the future and trying to
make it real.
5. The Not-Yet
One of the counterintuitive aspects of Vision 2030 is
just how popular the imagined vistas are across all sec-
tors of Nairobi’s population. The ‘world class’ visions
of capsular, enclaved futures—though they would seem
intended to exclude Nairobi’s low-income residents—
are regarded as desirable, ‘beautiful’, ‘smart’. This is
something that scholars of fantastical masterplanning
have noted in other cities. In Baku, capital of Azerbai-
jan, Bruce Grant observed the popularity of exclusive im-
agery among poorer residents: ‘whether there is an ac-
tual place for them in these new structures or not, this
new spate of building has had a profoundly inclusive ef-
fect’ (Grant, 2014, p. 503). In Kinshasa, De Boeck noted
how even those struggling to get by ‘revel as much in
this dream of the modern city as the ruling elites’ (2012,
p. 323). In Georgia, Pelkmans has suggested that it is the
prospective nature of plans that makes them attractive;
the fact that these scenes remain unbuilt, unpeopled, is
significant. Their emptiness and potentiality affords the
possibility of a future of fulfilled aspirations, and the lack
of implementation in fact enables the maintenance of
that dream: ‘they belonged to the realm of the future
and therefore remained potentially accessible to every-
one’ (Pelkmans, 2006, p. 207).
Whilst this has certain resonances with the popu-
larity of Vision 2030 in Nairobi, I think a slightly differ-
ent form of engagement is at work. As I explore fur-
ther below, local residents are concerned about their
potential exclusion from the seductive vision, but they
nevertheless agree that the future it imagines is desir-
able. Even when the promises of Vision 2030 start to
appear fragile, their instability exposed by lack of imple-
mentation, political wrangling, corruption or abandoned
projects, the expectation and seductive weight of Vision
2030 still seems to hold fast. In a different context, Har-
vey and Knox have argued that it is not despite the dis-
orderly excesses of planning but because of them that
infrastructural schemes are able to maintain their capac-
ity to enchant: ‘It is through an articulation with the
lived, material encounters of stasis, rupture and block-
age that infrastructural promises become reinvigorated
and recast’ (Harvey & Knox, 2012, p. 534). This fragility
leaves space for residents to enact their own interpreta-
tions of promised futures, to reconfigure them andmake
them anew.
Temporally speaking, residents also hold on to the
forms of linear development that Vision 2030 proposes:
the unfolding of processual time that is inherent to gov-
ernmental planning (Abram & Weszkalnys, 2013). Even
where residents fear their capacity to reach it is being
thwarted, they still aspire to the destination of Vision
2030. The question of why peoplemight approve ofmod-
els that would appear to exclude them is a tricky one.
Of course, we should not assume that everything peo-
ple say need be fundamentally coherent; ideas and opin-
ions are worked out in the process of discussion and
encounter. Furthermore, across a whole neighbourhood
like Kaloleni—inevitably shot through with factions and
conflicts, like any community—many different perspec-
tives will be in circulation. Nevertheless, I suggest, res-
idents’ approval of the fantasy of Vision 2030, even as
they fear exclusion from it, is based on particular disjunc-
tive temporal experiences in which present and future
become entangled in important ways. As residents try to
anticipate and live towards the future, they inevitably do
so from the present—a present in which fantastical im-
ages of the future are in circulation. By embedding the
‘not yet’ into the ‘now’, these juxtapositions create dis-
concerting temporal simultaneity. The schemes of Vision
2030 are based on linear developments and project time-
lines that envisage a future-perfect city as a destination
that will be reached within a specific timeframe. But in
their anticipation of this destination, the imaging strate-
gies also give the impression of the future having arrived
already (see also Lagerkvist, 2007, p. 160).
Nevertheless, the gap between the plan and the fu-
ture it envisages is filled with discrepancies (Abram &
Weszkalnys, 2013, p. 21). Multiple temporalities are in
play: the idealised orders imagined in the plan are often
disrupted, not only by obstinate landscapes or political
reappraisals, but by the anticipations, speculations and
anxieties it invokes through its potentiality, its status as
‘not-yet’ (Elliott & Smith, 2015). Thus planning may com-
pel other types of action in the present, upsetting proces-
sual time with recursive eddies of social, material or po-
litical consequence, which in turnmay initiate new judge-
ments of the plan, as well as recalibrations of aspiration
and ambition (Abram&Weszkalnys, 2013, p. 22; see also
Kracauer, 1995). For residents in Nairobi, this has consid-
erable import for temporal experience. In one of these
eddies, the future appears to be receding ever further
into the distance, seemingly out of the reach of ordinary
citizens, whilst in another eddy, time is experienced as
compressed and the future already at hand.
6. ‘Our Changes’?
On 11 December 2013, a new advertisement appeared
on a huge billboard just outside Kaloleni, along the main
road running through Eastlands (Figure 1). The billboard
came with no warning, and was not accompanied by any
public meeting or distribution of information to explain
its meaning or presence. The image it presents is of a
digital rendering of high-rise apartment blocks arranged
around a large multi-lane highway. In the foreground,
in the centre of a landscaped roundabout, is a circular
grey sign that reads Karibu Kaloleni:Welcome to Kaloleni.
The text emblazoned across the billboard statesMabadi-
liko Yetu, Our Changes, as though this is the promise of
an inclusive future. The thirteen-floor high-rises are uni-
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Figure 1. The billboard showing the architects’ rendering of a ‘New Kaloleni’. Jogoo Road, Nairobi, December 2013. Photo
by the author.
formly coloured cream and rust-brown, and arranged in
orderly rows that recede into the distance. In the fore-
ground, tiny pedestrians—dwarfed by the scale of the
project—can be seen walking along yellow footpaths un-
der mature trees. Cars move unimpeded along a smooth
tarmacked highway, the speed of their movement indi-
cated by digitally rendered blurring. Later that Decem-
ber, the image from the billboard appeared online on
Jambonewspot, an informal news blog, along with other
images of the same project. These were even more fan-
tastical than the billboard. One was a radical reimagining
of the infrastructure along Jogoo Road, featuring futuris-
tic geometric glass and steel skyscrapers, palm trees, and
a large highway. A sign saying ‘New Kaloleni’ directs traf-
fic into the reimagined estate.
These digitally rendered visions are in stark contrast
to the present reality of Kaloleni: a neighbourhood of
decaying bungalows interspersed with corrugated iron
informal dwellings. Previously tarmacked roads have
turned to dust, broken streetlights lean precariously at
awkward angles, rubbish is no longer collected and lies
piled up around the estate. The contemporary experi-
ence of Jogoo Road is also drastically different from the
vista that appeared online. Jogoo Road is themain artery
of Eastlands, but it is usually clotted with a tight mass of
barely moving traffic, thick clouds of fumes choking the
atmosphere. The edges of the street are a mishmash of
dirt paths, broken streetlights, thickets of informal hawk-
ers, verges clogged with rubbish and more corrugated
iron. The disjunct between image and reality is vast. The
fanciful panoramas certainly do not seem oriented to-
wards the current life of the area, a place where unem-
ployment is high and those in work are concentrated in a
miscellany of jobs in the informal economy. The strategy
behind these images was never made clear—there were
no related public announcements—but it would seem
highly unlikely that they would be available or affordable
to current residents, even if subsidised.
And yet the images were generally regarded posi-
tively. The billboard and associated images generated
intense discussion both within the estate and on so-
cial media after photos were uploaded to Facebook. On-
line, many comments were favourable, from straightfor-
ward ‘Wow! Great project’ and ‘This is amazing!!!’ to
ones flavoured with the language of development and
progress, including ‘This is what I see in the first world’
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and—in an echo of colonial masterplanning—‘The real
city in the sun’. Such approval also characterised dis-
cussions with local residents. In comparison to the ex-
tant housing, with its rundown infrastructure and piles
of rubbish, the clean, orderly vision on the billboard
seemed attractive to many. The image was described as
‘smart’, ‘beautiful’ and in Kiswahili ‘poa sana’—very cool.
‘These places are very modern. Who wouldn’t want a
new kitchen?’ one man asked rhetorically.
7. The Future Now
The futures anticipated in Vision 2030’s plans have not
yet been realised, andmaywell nevermanifest at all. But
though they are digital imaginings, they are also of the
present. They circulate via billboards, advertising hoard-
ings, onwebsites and in newspapers, giving them a physi-
cal presence in the everyday city and thrusting them into
people’s lives. By capturing the imaginations of a whole
range of Nairobians, these images set in motion hopes,
anxieties and speculations, influencing lived experiences
of the city, as well as personal horizons for the future. As
such, the images work to reveal the potentiality of the
‘not-yet’ in the present: the productivity of its enchant-
ment, as well as its disenchantment.
In a discussion about the scene on the billboard
with a young man named Eric, the conversation quickly
turned towards his own domestic aspirations. Born and
brought up in a crumbling house in Kaloleni and earning
a meagre income working in a small café, Eric was nev-
ertheless ambitious: ‘I want to build my own house’, he
said, ‘Imagine coming home to a house that is yours’. He
frequently imagines the kind of place he will build, he
told me: a three-bedroom detached house on its own
plot. ‘There is nothing like the feeling of coming home
from work to a house that is yours, that you do not rent’,
he anticipates. In hismind he fills the roomswith new fur-
niture,making sure everything is organised and colourful.
In particular, he longs for a modern bathroom. In Eric’s
imagination, all the bedrooms are en suite, the running
water is reliable and he can shower any time. ‘Just in your
house, relaxing, taking a shower, feeling it’s yours…’ he
mused. Eric was quite clear that his dreams of the per-
fect house are in part shaped by the sleek images of ur-
ban panoramas he sees all around him. ‘You see all this
real estate up there [indicating the billboard]. You know
it’s expensive, but of course youwant’, he toldme simply.
His fantasies of a particularmaterial future are intimately
entangled with the visual culture of digital architectural
design that enters themarketingmachine of property de-
velopment and circulates throughout Nairobi.
The types of anticipatory actions provoked by Vision
2030 are not always so positive. Previous urban renewal
projects in Nairobi have been far from transparent, and
claims of land-grabbing, corporate intrigue, elite capture
and removal of sitting tenants have been rife (see Rigon,
2014). Given such precedents, residents fear Eastlands
renewal may mean exclusion and eviction, and are set-
ting in motion other forms of action. Hassan has lived in
Kaloleni all his life. He has raised his own sons, now in
their twenties, in the estate, but he now fears for their
future. He plans to pre-empt the renewal project bymov-
ing out of Kaloleni:
…So even our worries are there ‘cause when they
bring these houses down, they’ll build modern
houses…we won’t get and we cannot afford. This Vi-
sion what-what. So even our children are thinking ‘so,
we move. We move now or we wait and we cannot
afford’. You know, cost is rampant in this Nairobi. Up,
up, up. So we say better [to] plan now.
In Hassan’s plans to move his family from the estate, we
see howanuncertain future inserts itself into the present
and compels new types of actions. Vision 2030—even if
it remains immaterial—creates new ‘economies of antic-
ipation’ as local people recalibrate their aspirations and
try to predict what horizons will remain open to them
(Elliott, 2016, p. 512).
Hassan is far from alone in trying to live towards an
uncertain future. In May 2014 near the railway line that
runs through Eastlands, Imet twomen constructing a cor-
rugated iron lean-to; an extension to a small, timeworn
house. When I asked what the structure was for, one of
the men stopped hammering and looked up. ‘This is Vi-
sion 2030!’ he laughed. ‘We have waited so long for in-
vestment in this place, but still it is not coming’. He ex-
plained that his house is overcrowded—his children have
to sleep on the floor. ‘So now we can’t wait any longer,
that is why we are doing it’, he continued. ‘We are do-
ing our own urban renewal!’. Rather than seeking to pre-
empt Vision 2030, as Hassan intends, these residents are
trying to surmount the gap between the plan and its im-
plementation by taking it on for themselves. The future
as imagined in schemes like Vision 2030 is not thirteen
years away, but understood as available—up for grabs—
in the present.
8. There’s Nothing We Shall Get!
Though the spectacular imagery of Vision 2030 repre-
sents a desirable future, for many Kaloleni residents this
enthusiasm is tempered by their fears of exclusion from
such schemes. The gap between the material present
and the future envisaged in digital renderings can feel
impossible to overcome. Many interviewees caveated
their endorsement of the billboard with doubts about
the practicalities: how could such a project be built with-
out displacing sitting tenants? Would the apartments be
for rent or for sale? For how much? Wasn’t it likely that
current residents would never benefit?
In their discussions about the billboard, residents of-
ten simultaneously evoked fantasies about what the vi-
sionmight bring, and fears aboutwhat itmight take away.
Boniface said, ‘I for one would like to get a bigger house.
This billboard, yes, it can be good. I would like to get a
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house that gives me a big living room’. But he also added
‘Let me tell you for a fact, when things become practical,
a lot of guys who have money will be the ones benefit-
ting from this’. Monica was fairly typical when she said,
‘I’m on the side of change. If they can take us to a mod-
ern system it can be good’, and then qualified this with
doubts about the implementation:
…if those who are going to do it are genuine people, if
they are transparent, [if] they are trustworthy is when
it will be ok. In Kenya there’s a lot of corruption. You
can’t say it will be good. It might have some prob-
lemswithmaybe thosewho are going to build houses,
the tenders…those who are going to get tenders and
how the tenders will be, you know, will be given. You
never know.
Such ambivalence also tinted Maggie’s comments as she
summed up the shades of local opinion:
Some of us are happy because we might get these
modern houses and it will be good…some people say
we don’t know. Even if they are to be built, they have
to allocate [properly]…Some of us are even saying no
[to the billboard]. Maybe those houses when they’ll
be built, maybe it might go to the big people, and
we’ll be left with nothing. Peasants, there’s nothing
we shall get!
As Kaloleni residents described their fears of exclusion,
that the future would be ‘for the big people’ and not for
the likes of them, they expressed frustration at being left
behind, where they felt that time seemed to stand still,
or even to go backwards. This was apparent in the views
of Dolly, another local resident. Dolly’s council house is
very worn, the furniture tired and tatty, the walls en-
grained with dust and grubby finger marks. The old con-
crete floor is bare and no repairs have been undertaken
for many years. Dolly expressed her frustration about life
in Nairobi, of the failures of its governance and of waiting
for things that never come:
We are left behind. We used to have water, [today]
there’s no water. The roads—you see how they are.
We used to have footpaths, they are no longer there.
These houses are just like [a] museum anyway. But
people are still living in them!
In her assessment, a museum is not a positive compar-
ison: the implication is that the houses are static, stuck
in place and time, while the city moves on around them.
‘They say we are going to Vision 2030, but we are going
back’, she concluded.
How could residents feel so invested in the 2030 vi-
sionswhilst concurrently also deeply suspicious that they
will never benefit from its promises? In their work on
infrastructural projects in Peru, Harvey and Knox take
up the notion of enchantment to understand how such
schemes retain their lustre and promise ‘even in the
face of specific circumstances in which they are acknowl-
edged as having failed to deliver’ (2012, p. 523). Follow-
ing Bennett (2001), they take enchantment not as super-
stition or belief in the supernatural, but as a ‘visceral, af-
fective form of relating to that which is sidelined or cast
out of formalised, rationalised descriptions of material
and social phenomena’ (Harvey & Knox, 2012, p. 523).
The billboard image was enchanting because the future
it seemed to promise offered the possibility of transcend-
ing existing social and material arrangements. But it was
also precisely this promise that made it dubious in the
eyes ofmany residents. One interviewee, aman in his for-
ties named Duncan, expressed this clearly when he told
me, ‘No one can be for that image’, explaining that be-
cause it was so enticing, because the apartments looked
so expensive and exclusive, ‘definitely they will be out of
our league’. This is a future indefinitely out of reach. Even
as residents seek to anticipate the future, they simultane-
ously describe a sense of temporal inertia, of living in an
endless present.
9. Conclusion
The experiences of ordinary Nairobi residents do not
match up with the panoramas and new beginnings envis-
aged by Vision 2030 and its promises of ‘achieving mid-
dle income status’ (Government of Kenya, 2007, p. 3).
Residents’ anxieties about being excluded from such vi-
sions show how the material conditions of their living
and dwelling seem to make the fantasy of Vision 2030
both more alluring and more out of reach. Rather than
experiencing the steady progress of developmental time,
where one thing comes predictably after another, I have
suggested that many in Eastlands feel themselves to ex-
perience a dissonant coexistence of temporalities, where
multiple temporal experiences are felt concurrently. This
dissonance is deeply influenced by the seductive power
of Vision 2030’s visual culture: the image trail that circu-
lates in the city is not immaterial, rather it is part of the
‘stuff’ of the city, entangled in the reconfiguration of ur-
ban spaces and urban lives (Bunnell & Das, 2010, p. 282).
In the particular terrain of Eastlands inNairobi,where
Vision 2030 is reorienting temporalities and aspirations,
I have shown how fantasies of an enclaved ‘world city’,
though they might seem far removed from Nairobi’s cur-
rent disintegrating materialities, nevertheless have be-
come enmeshed in the everyday lives of ordinary citi-
zens. This has important implications for scholarly ap-
proaches to the current spate of spectacular master-
planning. Rather than dismissing spectacular simulations
or cookie-cutter urban replication, it enables instead a
more open-ended approach that attends to ways that
seductive imaging and utopian language can have tangi-
ble effects.
As critics of Vision 2030, Kaloleni residents cast them-
selves in the role of catchers-up on a road where the des-
tination seems to be slipping further and further away.
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Or, as Dolly tells it, ‘we are left behind’, living in a mu-
seum where time stands still. And yet, the enchanting
digital vistas give the impression that the future has ar-
rived already. Living among the dream images of Vision
2030 has set in motion new types of actions, as people
plan alternative futures or take up newconstruction prac-
tices, seeking to remake the city in ways that go beyond
De Boeck’s ‘architecture of words’. The spatial and tem-
poral gap between the dream of Vision 2030 and its im-
plementation has left room for anticipatory actions that
try to make the future more knowable. In so doing, resi-
dents in Eastlands seek to upset the exclusivity of a daz-
zling, capsular future Nairobi. But at the same time this
gap can feel vast, even insurmountable, as their own ex-
periences have bitterly revealed. Even as they work to
make it present, the seductions of Vision 2030 are en-
twined with exclusionary forces that keep them at arm’s
length. The future-perfect city remains an exclusive mi-
rage always just out of reach.
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